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-vs-




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Harold Michael Brown, was con-
victed of the crime of second degree burglary on 
jury trial in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant, bound over to district court, was 
charged by information with the crime of burglary 
in the second degree. A trial was held on June 14, 
1966. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charg-
ed in the information. The Honorable Maurice Hard-
ing sentenced the appellant to serve in the Utah 
State Prison the indeterminate sentence provided 
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by law. From the conviction and judgment the c"'p-
pellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 14, 1966, Mr. Ronald Leroy Call, Jr. 
left a residence hall at the Brigham Young Univer-
sity shortly after midnight. Mr. Call, in company with 
his brother, Richard Call, was proceeding to his 
automobile which was parked on an adjacent park-
ing lot (TR of trial p. 11). The parking area was well 
lighted (TR of trial p. 12). While at a distance of 150 
feet from his automobile, Ronald Call noticed a per-
son seated in his vehicle (TR of trial p. 12-16). This 
person was identified by Ronald Call as the appel-
lant, Harold Michael Brown (TR of trial p. 15-18). Ap-
pellant then ran from the Call automobile to an 
automobile parked nearby. Ronald Call further test-
ified that the appeallant was carrying certain items 
as he ran (TR of trial pp. 12, 13). Ronald Call ran to 
the vehicle in which the appellant was then seated, 
engaged the appellant briefly in a conversation, 
whereupon the appellant handed to Ronald Call 
certain items identified by Mr. Call as his property 
(TR of trial pp. 13, 14, 15). Mr. Call testified further 
that when he returned to his automobile, the glove 
compartment had been forced open and also that 
certain of the items recovered from the appellant 
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were in the glove compartment shortly prior to his 
contact with the appellant (TR of trial pp. 11, 20). The 
appellant presented no evidence. 
Based on the above evidence, it is submitted 
that the conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS. 
Appellant contends the complaining witness, 
Ronald Call, stated an opinion or conclusion which 
over appellant's objection was allowed to stand. 
The controversial exchange appears as follows (TR 
of trial p. 14): 
Mr. Sorensen (District Attorney): Where did 
he get those to hand them back to you? (re-
ferring to various items of the witnesses' prop-
erty). 
Mr. Van Seiver (Defense Council): I object, 
your honor. 
The Court: He may answer. 
The Witness: Out of my car. 
Mr. Sorensen: Well, I mean, when you spoke 
to him, did he go back to your car and get 
them? 
Witness: No, sir. He gave them back to me 
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from his car. 
The respondent contends the answer of the 
witness is not a conclusion, but a statement of his 
observations. This same witness had previously test-
ified that the items in question were in his automo-
bile prior to his confrontation of the appellant (TR 
of trial pp. 9, 10); that appellant was seated in the 
witness's automobile (TR of trial p. 12); that he ob-
served the appellant carry certain objects and tapes 
from his car (TR of trial p. 13). It would follow there-
fore that when this witness testified that the appel· 
lant these items from the witness's automobile, it 
was not because the witness assumed, concluded or 
opined this to have happened, but because this wit-
ness, as an eye witness to the commission of a fel-
ony, observed it to happen. 
The respondent further contends the effect of 
the witness's statement, if error at all, was greatly 
ameliorated by the subsequent question by Mr. 
Sorensen. It should be noted, after the disputed 
question was virtuly withdrawn and another quest-
ion substituted, (T.14) no effort was made by appel-
lant to strike the answer to the original question. 
Respondent has no argument with the cases which 
hold conclusions and opinions are inadmissible 
under certain circumstances, but feels the matter 
stated on testimony should be a conclusion or opin-
ion and not an observed fact, in order to apply the 
cases cited in appellant's brief to the instant case, 
Further, even if the evidence were irrelevant, 
incompetent and immaterial it would not furnish a 
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ground for reversal where there is abundant comp-
etent evidence to establish the fact sought to be 
proved by such evidence. Baird v. Denver & R.G.R. 
R., 49 Utah 58, 162 Pac. 79 (1916); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 
61. 
Clearly the record discloses an abundance of 
competent, undisputed evidence as to every ele-
ment of the crime charged; as a result the trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE LAW OF RECENT 
POSSESSION. 
Appellant urges the necessity of his proposed 
instruction on recent possession of stolen property 
in the instant case. He argues that without this in-
struction the jury was entitled to conclude that by 
virtue of the possession of certain goods the entry 
of the automobile was made (brief of appellant p. 6). 
Appellant overlooks the instructions charged in the 
instant case. The jury was instructed to dutifully 
follow the law as stated by the court (R-21); and that 
the following must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(1) The unlawful, felonious entry of Ronald 
Call's automobile by the defendant, (2) The spec-
ific intent to steal from the victim at the time of entry, 
(3) That the entry occured during the nighttime, on 
on or about a specific date (R-25). 
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These two instructions, when considered to-
gether, preclude any such fanciful notion as ad-
vanced by appellant regarding the entitlement of the 
jury to conclude entry from recent possession of 
certain property. The jury was charged to find spec-
ific entry and nothing else would suffice under the 
instructions. 
It was totally unnecessary for the trial court to 
inject, on appellant's urging, any theory regarding 
the consideration of recent possession of stolen prop-
erty in order to "presume" the appellant's guilt: 
The entire prosecution in the instant matter was pred-
icated upon the testimony of an eye witness who 
apprehended the appellant at the scene of the crime 
(R-13). What necessity compels the trial court to in-
struct the jury that they must find that the possession 
was sufficiently recent to exclude every other rea-
sonable hypothesis than burglary, as submitted by 
appellant in his proposed instruction (R-18)? 
In 23A C. J. S. Criminal Law§ 1310 it is stated: 
The instructions should be predicated on, and applic-
able to, the issues presented by the pleadings and the 
evidence, and should be concrete as to each issuable, 
and should be concrete as to each issuable fact, not 
abstract; an instruction which although it states a 
correct legal proposition, is not based on, or applic-
able to, the issues raised by the pleadings and the 
evidence, or which is abstract is erroneous and prop-
erly refused. 
Accord: State v. Bebee, 110 Utah 484, 174 P.2d 478 
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(1946); State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 
153 (1946); State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 116 P.2d 
398 0941); State v. Chealey, 100 Utah 423, 116 P.2d 
377 (1941); State v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354 
(1940); State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 
(1933). 
Further, respondent contends the refusal of trial 
court to grant appellant's proposed instruction was 
not non-prejudicial but favorable to the appellant. 
Under the instructions given by the court it was 
necessary to establish all the elements of burglary 
without the benefit or use of inference or presump-
tion; whereas if the court had granted the proposed 
instruction the burden on the state was appreciably 
less, in that an unlawful entry could be inferred by 
possession of stolen property when coupled with 
other facts and circumstances. The error, if such it 
was, in refusing the instruction was clearly not prej-
udicial. The appellant received the instructions he 
was entitled to on the law applicable to the evi-
dence. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN REFUSING TO GRANT PROBATION OF 
THE APPELLANT. 
This court in State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 
P.2d 388 (1957) observed: 
Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no 
matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of 
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crime may be able to demonstrate to the trial judge 
the granting or withholding of probation involver: 
considerable intangibles of character, personality and 
attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling. 
These matters, which are to be considered in con-
nection with the prior record of the accused, are of 
such nature that the problem of probation must oi 
necessity rest within the discretion of the Judge who 
hears the case. 
An extensive hearing was held before the trial 
court on July 29, 1966, concerning a further stay of 
execution on the judgment of committment pro-
nounced against appellant on July 15, 1966. At the 
hearing it was determined the appellant had a prior 
criminal record (TR of hearing p. 12); that appellant 
was awaiting action on a criminal charge origi-
nating in Salt Lake County (TR of hearing p. 13); and 
further, that appellant had given inconsistent ex-
planations to police authorities and probation offi· 
cials regarding the origin of certain items in the poss· 
ession of appellant at the time of his apprehension 
(TR of hearing pp. 14, 15). Respondent therefore sub· 
mits that the record clearly discloses a sufficient and 
substantial basis to sustain the action of the trial 
court in refusing probation. 
It is urged that the trial court improperly con· 
sidered appellant's possession of certain items which 
were seized in violation of appellant's constitutional· 
ly protected rights. In support of this position appel· 
lant incorporates in his brief an unidentified minute 
entry (brief of appellant p. 9) which is not part of the 
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record and therefore not entitled to consideration 
on appeal [Brandley v. Lewis. 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 
338 (1939)J. 
The question of the constitutionally prohibited 
search and seizure was not before the trial court dur-
ing the hearing, and the absence of evidence on the 
matter was even brought to appellant's attention 
(TR of hearing p. 17). It appears, therefore, the ques-
tion is being presented initially on appeal and should 
not be considered by this court [State v. Starlight 
Club. 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965); State v. 
Hammond. 64 Wash. 2d 591, 392 P.2d 1010 (1964)J. 
A further contention is urged by appellant in 
that the trial court required appellant to testify 
against himself, by admitting guilt, or face a denial 
of probation. The precise issue was raised and ar-
gued in the Sibert case (supra) where the court 
stated: 
It is contended that the effect of such reasoning is 
to force defendant to either testify against himself 
or have probation denied, which would violate the 
constitutional protections against self incrimination. 
(United States Constitution Amend V; Utah Consti-
tution art I, § 12). He has no refuge in such provis-
ions after he has been convicted of the crime in ques-
tion. 
Respondent submits, therefore, the position of ap-
pellant lacks support in both law and logic. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the record refutes appellant's 
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assertions that error arose from admission of tes-
timony stating a conclusion. The trial court properly 
refused to instruct the jury on the law of recent pos-
session as the issue was not raised in the evidence. 
Further, the trial court, soundly and fairly exercised 
its discretion in denying probation of the appellant. 
The appeal is without merit and the conviction 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
